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Tillich: I am so sorry that I wasn’t able to attend any further public lectures 
of yours. Mrs. Tillich, however, attended the art lecture. She was an art­
historian in Germany.
De Martino for Hitantartu: Did she offer any comment?
Tillich: Yes. She was very much grasped by the way in which you combined 
art and the experience of the ultimate—the transcendent formlessness.
DeMartino: The Formless Self.
Tillich: Yes, the Formless Self; how you coupled the artistic form with the 
Formless Self. I don't know whether you have a special subject to discuss 
today. If not, I would like to ask this question, because I have been asked 
myself about it: “How do you integrate them?” Mrs. Tillich simply said 
that you did, but she couldn’t develop how. So I would like to ask you: 
“How did you bring together the Formless Self and the artistic form?1’
Fujiyoibi for Hisamatiu: I also have many questions to ask you: I should like to 
learn from you; but we may start with this.
Huamatsu (in Japanese): What I call the Formless Self includes, in so far as it 
is Self, Self-awareness. But by this Formless Self (or Self-awareness), I mean 
the ‘Formless-Myself,’ which ‘Formless-MyselP has activities. In its activi­
ties, then, the Formless Self expresses—or presents—Itself.
• For the Introductory Statement and Part One, see the Eattem Bnddbitt, Vol. IV, No. 2, 
October, 1971, pp. 89-107. Ed.
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Fujiyotbi for Hiiamattu: He says that the Formless Self-—as Self—means Self- 
consciousness, and since it is Self—or the Formless “Myself’—it has func­
tions. So, when the Formless Self functions, it expresses Itself.
DeMartino: What is being underscored here is that the Zen Formless Self is 
not a dead ontological concept. It is rather a “Irving” Self-awakening—or 
Self-actualization—capable of creative Self-expression.
Tillich: With contents? Not beyond contents?
DeMartino: “With contents” and “beyond contents." For, on the one hand, 
as a “living” Formlessness that is functioning, it can express Itself in—or 
through—any content. On the other hand, however, whatever the content 
or “form,” artistic or otherwise, through which it may express Itself, it 
always expresses Itself as a Formless—and in that sense as a 1 ‘content- 
less”—Self.
De Martino to Hiiamattu (in Japanese): Dr. Tillich’s question was whether the 
expression of the Formless Self is with contents or beyond contents.
Hiiamattu (in Japanese): The Formless Self has boundless contents. In Zen 
it is said, “In ‘Not-a-Single-Thing’ there is an inexhaustible store of con­
tents.”
Fujiyoibi for Hiiamattu: It has endless contents.
Tiliicb: Endless?
DeMartino: The forms or contents available to it are unlimited.
Tiliicb: So content would mean, for example, the sea, the mountain, or the 
landscape that is painted.
Hiiamattu (in Japanese): No. Scenery, such as mountains and rivers or flowers 
and birds, constitutes the Moment for the Formless Self to express Itself. 
Zen art has nothing to do with a realistic copying of natural phenomena. 
When painted, the landscape may seem to be the content of the painting, 
but the true content is the Formless Self.
Fujiyoibi for Hiiamattu; He says that the mountain, river, bird, or flower that 
is painted is a kind of content....
Tiliicb: Of the Formless Self?
DeMartino; Or “Motif.” Actually, he used the German word, Moment. The 
bird or the landscape serves as the Moment of the Formless Self in its Self- 
expression.
Hiramattu (in Japanese): So the Moment is not the real content.
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De Martino for Hiiamatsu: The Moment or Motif is thus only the apparent con­
tent; the genuine content is the Formless Self—ever manifesting Itself, 
it might again be added, as a “formless-form” or a “contentless-contcnt.” 
Tillicb: But it appears in the Moment. Now, does Moment here signify the 
moment of time?
DeMartino: It might be better to take it as Motif.
Ttllicb: Both words come from moverem, “moving” in English. Moment is a 
derivation of movere, to move. It is originally Latin, movimentum, the move­
ment.
Hisamatsu (in Japanese): For Moment, there is in Buddhism the expression 
“en” (#).
De Martino for Hiiamatsu: Akin to Moment is a Buddhist word that may be 
translated as “condition” or “relation.”
Fujiyabi: “Condition” or “impulse.”
Tillicb: You wouldn’t say “element”?
Fujiyosbi for Hiiamatsu: No; it is not element.
DeMartino: I think that your term, kairos, the right time, would be closer. 
For in one of its meanings, the Buddhist concept that he mentioned, en, in 
Japanese, may be taken as connoting the right condition at the right time— 
so, perhaps, the right “occasion.” For instance, a Zen student totally ab­
sorbed in or grasped by his ultimate problem (or koan), suddenly hears a 
bird singing: the constellation—or “affinity”—of those conditions being 
just right, he awakens.
Tillicb: He hears a bird sing?
De Martino: Yes.
Tillich: Namely, in a way that makes it possible for him to make music also. 
DeMartino: Yes; hearing the bird sing, as you would say, “opens him up” to 
his true Self. The conditions being exactly right at that time, through the 
en, Moment, or occasion of the bird singing, he hears the Song of Him-Self— 
or in more traditional Zen terminology, he hears the ‘Sound of One-Hand.’ 
This “relation”—if it can be called such—may then later be reversed. Thus, 
if the awakened Formless Self should paint the form of a bird singing, that 
would now be an expression—or “singing”—of the Formless Self through 
the Moment of the bird.
Tillich: Because he was opened up by the bird singing?
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DeMartino: It needn’t be solely because of that. He could also paint something 
else with form and express his True—or Formless—Self through that Motif 
or Moment.
Hisamatsu (in Japanese): Hence, things with form are really without form. 
Whatever has form has its authentic import in having no form.
De Martino for Hisamatsu: Consequently, a form expresses its genuine nature 
in transcending or negating its form—in other words, as a “form-without- 
form,” or, again, as a “formless-form.”
Hisamatsu (in Japanese): The mark of Zen aesthetic appreciation, accordingly, 
is to see within form what is formless—which means to see in things with 
form the Self-Without-Form.
DeMartino for Hisamatsu: The key to an appreciation of Zen art, therefore, is 
to appreciate in the artistic form the Self-Without-Form that is being ex­
pressed... (Tillich: In it?)...yes, or through it.
Tillich: That is quite similar to my own thinking. The “depth of being in it,” 
I would call it.
DeMartino: Instead of “Being,” Dr. Hisamatsu prefers the designation, “Form­
less Self.” He didn’t say this, but I think that one point of difference be­
tween the two of you is that whereas for you “depth of being” eventually 
leads to God as the ultimate source of being, for him it would not be God 
but Self—man’s true or “Formless” Self.
Tillich: Yes. Perhaps, then, we should now turn to what Dr. Hisamatsu wishes 
to ask. I am open for your question.
Hisamatsu (in Japanese): The question I would like to ask is this: historically 
there have always been various religions; but can they all properly be called 
religions? Expressed otherwise, what is true or justifiable religion? I think 
that religion ought to have an objective validity in human nature that is 
different from that of science, art and morality. Yet, although different 
from—and transcending—all of the latter, it ought to be of significance for 
them also. But where in man’s nature is there the basis for such a religion? 
In brief, my question is where in the nature of the human being would you 
find the valid, objective ground for religion?
De Martino for Hisamatsu: Dr. Hisamatsu’s focal question is, “What constitutes 
true or justifiable religion?” Put another way, he is asking, “What in human 
nature would be the point of ‘objective validity5 that makes religion—as
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distinguished from science, art, or morality—both possible and necessary?” 
This is the problem he is discussing in his faculty seminar here at Harvard. 
To explain it a little further, science (or the cognitive enterprise generally), 
morals, and art all rest, in Dr. Hisamatsu’s view, on what is termed “autono­
mous reason,” but what is finally an inner contradiction. True religion, 
however, goes beyond science (or the cognitive-rational), beyond morals, 
and beyond art. The question that he is posing—and which he put to the 
faculty seminar—is: What is it in the make up of the human being that 
both constitutes the basis and accounts for the necessity of religion? In sum, 
if you wanted to establish the raison d’etre for religion through an analysis 
of man’s nature, where in that nature would you locate the foundation and 
the need for religion?
Tillicb: Perhaps I could say—not definitively, but as a preliminary answer— 
the experience of belonging to the Infinite and of being excluded from it 
at the same time. Man is by nature related to the Infinite. He is not infinite, 
but he is related to it. He is not without it, and he is at the same time ex­
cluded from it. This double relation seems to me to be the ground of all 
religion. That is a somewhat short answer to a long question; but, if you 
wish, I can elaborate it. By “excluded,” I mean “separated.” Also, I don’t 
use the word “God” here; I use “Infinite.”
De Martino: Man “belongs to” yet is “separated from” and therefore “longs 
for” the Infinite.
Tillicb: Yes. Good! Thank you. That is exactly what I mean.
Hiramatsu (in Japanese): When you speak of the “Infinite,” of longing for the 
“Infinite,” what is the Infinite? Is it in contrast to the finite?
De Martino for Hisamatsu: Dr. Hisamatsu asks if the infinite, as you intend it, 
stands opposed to finitude.
Tillicb: The word infinite includes some opposition, but if it were a sheer 
opposition it wouldn’t be infinite.
De Mar lino for Hisamatsu: Is it in some way without this antithesis? 
Tillicb: Not “without,” otherwise it would be a meaningless word.
De Martino for Hisamatsu: Does it both include and go beyond all dualistic 
polarities?
Tillicb: Perhaps I should give a few more of the relations. The first is that the 
Infinite is the ground of the finite, which does not mean “cause,” but which 
III
THE EASTERN BUDDHIST
means “creative ground.” The second is that the Infinite is the judge of the 
finite; there the real separation comes in. The third is that the Infinite is 
the reunion with the finite. I have now simplified my theological thinking, 
but these three relations should be mentioned.
DeMartino for Hisamatsu: Is this reunion the aim of religion?
Tillich: Yes.
Hisamatsu (in Japanese): Is it, then, that the divisiveness is on the side of the 
finite, while the “Grund” and the judging are on the side of the Infinite? 
In morals, for example, there is the redemption of good and evil. In the case 
of good and evil, how would you explain the relations of the Grund, the 
judging, and the final reunion?
DeMartino for Hiramatsu: He asks if you would illustrate the three aspects 
of the Infinite as they pertain to the problem of good and evil.
Tillich: The word “judging”—krinein, in Greek—means separating between 
good and evil.
DeMartino for Hisamatsu: When, in judging, the good is separated from the 
evil, what is the ground of that separation—or that “distinction”?
Tillich: The freedom of man to act against what he essentially is, is the evil— 
the possibility of evil.
DeMartino for Hisamatsu: Dr. Hisamatsu wishes to inquire now not about the 
source of evil, but about the basis for the discrimination between good and 
evil.
Ttllich: That is the same; the acting against one’s essential being.
DeMartino for Hisamatsu: What would the “reunion” represent in this matter 
of good and evil?
Ttllich: Overcoming evil by the good.
DeMartino for Hisamatsu: Is it actually possible for good to put an end to evil, 
or is this an interminable human quest? That is, is the reunion a real possi­
bility, or is it just an ever-elusive goal that man pursues endlessly?
Ttllich: This is not an alternative. In order to be in search of something, you 
must already have experienced it in some fragmentary way—otherwise 
you wouldn’t even ask for it.
De Martino for Hisamatsu: Is the fragmentary “having” a historical reality? 
Tillich: Yes. I would say that in our conversation today, some split between 
religions and human beings is being overcome fragmentarily.
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De Martino for Hisamattu: If that is a “fragmentary” reunion, what of the com­
plete or total reunion?
Tillich'. The total reunion is a transcendent symbol; it is not an empirical or 
experiential reality.
Hisamatsu (in Japanese): I can see that such a way of thinking will lead to that 
conclusion. But doesn’t this idea of reunion contain a contradiction? For 
what is sought as an historical actuality remains from beginning to end a 
symbol; that is, the reunion does not become actualized in history because 
it is in its very nature beyond man’s reach.
DeMartmo for Hisamatsu: Isn’t there a contradiction involved in this idea of 
reunion in that although seeking it may indicate some fragmentary having 
of it, by its own nature it is unattainable?
Tillichr Why is that a contradiction?
DeMartino for Hisamatsu: If the reconciliation sought cannot be attained, that 
for Dr. Hisamatsu is a contradiction in that man is striving for something 
that is not fully accessible to him.
Fujiyosbi for Hisamatsu: Is that not a contradiction as regards the reunion? 
DeMartino: Man’s having to seek it, wanting to seek it, trying to seek it, yet 
his being unable to actualize it because it is in fact unactualizable consti­
tutes, in Dr. Hisamatsu’s view, a contradiction.
Tillich: It is not a logical contradiction. It happens every day.
De Martino for HifcMM/nc The longing is not satisfied because it cannot be 
satisfied.
Tillich: No; I would say it is gratified, but only by anticipation. Perhaps be­
sides fragmentary fulfillment, you can also introduce the term “anticipa­
tion.” It surely comes nearer to what he wants. But anticipation of some­
thing is not having it. To anticipate it is a kind of having it, but is also a 
kind of not having it. Could you translate for him the German word, “For- 
wegnahme”'!
DeMartino for Hisamatsu: Then doesn’t this constitute the problem?
Tillich: Where is the problem?
Hisamatsu (in Japanese): The problem is that it is impossible for evil to be 
thoroughly subdued by the good, even though it ought to be. Any 
unqualified suppression,1 therefore, can be nothing other than a wish or 
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unfolfillable expectation. Wouldn’t this, however, leave man with a sense 
of hopelessness?
De Martino for Hisamatsu: The good cannot entirely eliminate the evil that 
ought to be radically eliminated. Any such eradication, accordingly, can 
be no more than a desire or unrealizable expectation. But can man rest with 
what amounts to this sort of a “hopeless-hope”?
Tillicb: There is another clement in it, a third element. There is hope; there 
is anticipation, which is more than hope; and the third element is the cer­
tainty that it has been overcome in Eternity.
De Martino for Hisamatsu: What is the basis of that certainty?
Tillicb: This is a most relevant question. The anticipatory experience indudes 
both the fulfillment and the not-yet-fulfillment. Out of the anticipatory 
experience we derive as an clement—we have in it as an element—the eter­
nal fulfillment: being Eternal in the midst of time. If we are Eternal in the 
midst of time, we are still in time; but there is an element in time—in the 
temporal moment—that is more than temporality. This is the answer to 
the question, “From where do you know?” For in the anticipatory act we 
have it by anticipation. It is wonderfully expressed in Paul; I cannot express 
it as well.
Fujiyosbi for Hisamatsu: Is this the same as Leibnitz’s theory of the prcestablished 
harmony of God?
Tillicb: I don’t think so. It is much more the paradox of St. Paul than it is 
Leibnitz’s philosophy. Perhaps I should give this quotation from Paul: “Not 
that I have reached it or that I be perfect; but I hunt after it—to grasp 
it—as I am grasped by Christ.” Now there you have both: “I hunt after 
it—to grasp it—as I am grasped.” Here you have the two sides.
Hisamatsu (in Japanese): If that is the case, does the anticipation take place 
in the form of faith?
Fujiyosbi for Hisamatsu: Is this anticipation or presupposition an expression of 
faith?
Tillicb: It is not presupposition, but anticipation. Presupposition is a logical 
argument; anticipation is an experience.
De Martino: Dr. Hisamatsu asked whether this is an anticipation of, by, or 
through faith.
Tillicb: That depends on what is understood by faith. If faith is taken as belief
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in something, then it has nothing to do with faith. But if faith is the state of 
being grasped or gripped by some ultimate concern—or by the ultimate, 
simply—then it is faith. Anticipation is not a logical argument, a presup­
position, or an act of belief; rather, it is an experience: an experience of the 
presence of the Ultimate in the preliminary, of the Eternal in the temporal, 
or of the Perfect in the imperfect. It can be spoken of as faith if faith is de­
fined as the state of being grasped by an ultimate concern.
De Martino for Hisamatsu: Then “anticipation’* is not identical with “ultimate 
concern.”
(Here there is a break in the tape.)
DeMartino for Tillicb (in Japanese): No; it is not the anticipation itself but 
what is anticipated that is the ultimate concern.
Hisamatsu (in Japanese): To return to the matter of morals, I think the reason 
that it is not possible for good to uproot evil exhaustively is that good cannot 
be established as such except in contrast to evil. Even if some specific good 
should once conquer some specific evil, this moral triumph would be no 
more than relative. Sooner or later another clash would inevitably ensue— 
which means, consequently, an unceasing conflict. So is it not precisely 
the nature of morals that precludes there ever being an absolute “good”? 
De Martino for Hisamatsu; He now asks for your comment concerning his own 
interpretation of morals: namely, that it is impossible for good to dislodge 
evil completely in so far as good can be discriminated as “good” solely in 
contradistinction to “not good”—or “evil.”
Tillicb: I didn’t say that.
De Martino: No, he is saying this. {Tillicb: Yes.)
DeMartino for Hisamatsu: While there may be a relative or temporary contain­
ment of some aspect of evil by some aspect of good, there cannot be a pure 
good in which the positive unconditionally displaces the negative. This is 
because it is an innate characteristic of judgment that the positive or affirm­
ative always entails—at least by logical implication—its negative opposite. 
Tillicb: Yes. In Eternity we anticipate a victory that does not abolish evil, 
but reduces it to mere potentiality. We can say that in God—or in the 
ground of being—evil is conquered not by being annihilated, but by not 
being actualized. It is actualized in finitude—in the finite world, but not 
in the infinite ground of being.
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DeMartino for Hisamatsu: Evil will avoid total effacement perennially, inasmuch 
as moral judgment has as its basis the duality of good and evil. In short, is 
it not the very nature of judgment that accounts for the impossibility of 
the negative judgmental clement ever being wholly obliterated? For would 
not any judgment neerssarily require—even if only, in your terms, as a 
“potential”—the negative pole?
Tillich: Yes; but “potential” is different from “actual.” Of course, the evil 
must be potential in the divine ground; otherwise it never could become 
actual.
Hisamatsu (in Japanese): But is that the way to solve the problem of evil 
historically?
De Martino to Hisamatsu (in Japanese): Not “historically.” Dr. Tillich’s posi­
tion is that evil is overpowered in Eternity, by being reduerd to mere 
potentiality—but it is not destroyed. This sort of subjugation is “antici­
pated” by man in history, but he cannot fully realize it historically.
Hisamatsu (in Japanese): That the outright destruction of the negative ele­
ment by the positive cannot be historical derives from the fact that judg­
ment itself—-whether moral, intellectual, or artistic—is based on the mutual 
discordance of the two elements.
De Marti no to Hisamatsu (in Japanese): Dr. Tillich would agree—in terms of 
“potentiality.” But for Dr. Tillich the difference is this: whereas in history’ 
the evil is actual—as is the good, in Eternity the evil does not become 
actualized; it is left as a sheer potentiality.
De Martino for Hisamatsu: When it is said that in Eternity evil is no more than 
a potentiality, is this to say that it disappears from actuality?
Tillich: Yes, and not just in the future, but also in the past and present.
DeMartino for Hisamatsu: Dr. Hisamatsu does not consider it possible for evil 
alone to be expunged from actuality.
Tillich: Yes, it is possible. Evil is never in God; therefore, in so fer as we parti­
cipate in Eternity, we are beyond evil.
DeMartino for Hisamatsu: Even if evil is reduced to potentiality in Eternity, 
would that remove it from actuality?
Tillich: In Eternity, but not in time. In time and history evil persists; the 
struggle in history is continuous.
DeMartino for Hisamatsu: So that historically the confrontation remains.
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Tillich: Historically it remains. I do not believe in the progressive elimination 
of evil.
DeMartino for Hisamatsu: Doesn’t this inability to do away with the conflict 
between good and evil in history present an ultimate problem for man?
Tillich: In what sense an ultimate problem?
DeMartino for Hisamatsu: In the sense that since the historical battle between 
good and evil will go on forever, this constitutes—as regards moral striv­
ing—an “aporia.”
Tillich: Yes, “aporia” “there is no way out.”
De Martino for Hisamatsu: Dr. Hisamatsu maintains, moreover, that this 
“aporia” is not peculiar to the field of morals, but is also to be found within 
the regions of the cognitive and the aesthetic.
Tillich: Oh, yes.
DeMartino for Hisamatsu: This is why he says that, finally, they all rest on an 
inner contradiction. For in whichever arena value-judgments are made, 
the “positive” value is inescapably antithetical to—and thereby indissolu­
bly linked with—the contradictory or “negative” value.
(Here there is another break in the tape.)
DeMartino for Tillich (in Japanese): Dr. Tillich says, “Pure being would be 
death.”
Hisamatsu (in Japanese): Then the problem is this: value does not subsist in 
isolation; it is unavoidably related to being. So, conversely, with being; 
for man, no being is dissociated from value. In man, therefore, these two are 
interfused.
DeMartino for Hisamatsu: Value docs not stand by itself; it is invariably con­
nected with existence or being. One does not make value-judgments apart 
from existence; nor is one involved in existence without making value­
judgments. For human beings these two go together. Dr. Hisamatsu*! 
point is that the absonance between the positive and the negative exists 
not solely in the domain of value, but also in that of being. Within the 
area of value, he is contending, a purely positive valuation is impossible; 
that is, there can never be pure goodness or pure truth or pure beauty.
Tillich: No, of course not.




Tiliicb; No. That would be death.
De Martino; Not that it would be death; but that the concept of being neces­
sarily implies non-being.
Tiliicb: I agree very much. Therefore I deny that there is being without non- 
being even in God.
Hiramatsu (in Japanese): Oh, docs Dr. Tillich also think so? Then, putting 
aside the case of God, with man, being and non-being—or as regards 
organic life, birth and death—are inseparable; they cannot but prevail 
dualistically. It is the same with value and dis-value. In man, consequently, 
the contradictions inhering in the dualities of being and non-being and of 
value and dis-value come to be one. This single, combined contradiction, 
. which is different from the relative contradictions that emerge from the 
process of history, may, accordingly, be considered to be man’s basic con­
tradiction.
DeMartino for Hisamatsu: For Dr. Hisamatsu the contradictory dichotomy 
between the positive and the negative indigenous to the singularly inter­
related worlds of value and being, is not a relative contradiction that arises 
from history, but is a fundamental or “root” contradiction that underlies 
man’s uniquely “human” existence.
Tiliicb: Yesi for man, so it is.
De Martino for Hisamatsu: Dr. Hisamatsu would like to ask if this may be re­
ferred to—-using Kant’s term, “Antinomic”—as the “ultimate antinomy”?
Tillich: Yes, antinomy in man. Yes; I could probably accept that, if I would 
see the implications.
DeMartino for Hisamatsu: His first question is whether this ultimate contra­
diction may be spoken of as an “ultimate antinomy”?
Tiliicb: No, I don’t call it a contradiction. A contradiction is a logical mistake. 
Hisamatsu (in Japanese): What I consider to be the “ultimate antinomy” is 
neither exclusively of logic nor of will nor of feeling; it involves all three. 
It cannot be reduced, therefore, either to contradiction, dilemma, or agony; 
all three are there as one.
De Martino for Hisamatsu: He agrees that taken strictly, “contradiction” is a 
logical designation; that is why he prefers the word “antinomy,” because 
he feels it is not restricted. His conception of the “ultimate antinomy”
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embraces at least three elements: in the logical or cognitive realm, it is that 
of contradiction; in the emotional or affective realm, of anguish; and in the 
volitional or conative realm—where will and decision are involved, of di­
lemma. In Dr. Hisamatsu’s view, human nature is such that these several 
components coalesced as one delineate man’s cardinal contradictory anta­
gonism—or “dualistic opposition.”
Tillicb: Of essential goodness and...(De Mar tin: No.) He does not use the 
words potential and actual?
De Martino: No. For Dr. Hisamatsu it is the dualistic opposition between the 
positive and the negative: existentially (or, if the term is permissible, “on- 
to-existentially”), between being and non-being; axiologically, between 
the good and the “not-good”—or “evil”—in the sphere of morals, the 
beautiful and the unbeautiful in aesthetics, and the true and the untrue in 
the dominion of the cognitive.
Tillicb: But the relation is much more dialectical: because the good, the true, 
or the beautiful is always that which is positive, which is given; while the 
other is the distortion of it, and cannot live without it. The good can be 
without the evil.
DeMartino: That is what he is denying.
Tillicb: The evil cannot be without the good. Here the only way of reconcili­
ation between us would be that he accept the distinction between poten­
tiality and actuality. Then I could agree with him, that potentially there 
must be evil even in God—potentially, but not actually.
Hisamatiu (in Japanese): Whether a matter of distortion or not, the contra­
dictory opposition of the two remains ineluctable.
DeMartino to Hisamatru (in Japanese): For Dr. Tillich, the good can be with­
out the evil.
Tillicb: But not without the potential evil. That is decisive. If he doesn’t 
accept the concepts of potential and actual, then I cannot maintain my 
position. Perhaps you can give him an example. Hate is the distortion of 
love, but love is not the distortion of hate.
Hiiamatiu (in Japanese): I should say it is not that you cannot maintain your 
position, it is more that we are unable to accept your position. But let us 
put that aside for the moment. My concern at present is to emphasize that 
this ultimate antinomy—or “dualism”—permeates the very center of man’s
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being; no attempt, consequently, to resolve it within this framework will 
ever be successful.
DeMartino for liuamatsu: What Dr. Hisamatsu wishes to stress at this juncture 
is that since human nature is innately beset by this core antinomy that 
includes as one all of the forms that it takes in the various dimensions men­
tioned, so long as man continues within his—or “its”—dualistic framework, 
the problem can never be resolved.
Tillich: Not resolved; but it is different whether it is simply going on or 
whether there is the fragmentary, anticipatory overcoming. This makes 
all the difference.
Hisamatsu (in Japanese): What I would like to speak of, however, is not a frag­
mentary, anticipatory overcoming, but a fundamental resolution that goes 
down to the root. For the ultimate antinomy can be resolved only at its 
root; that is why it cannot be dealt with either by cognitive-learning, moral­
ity, or art. Still, to solve this problem that reason cannot solve, there must 
be a solution that will nevertheless satisfy reason. That is, although the 
problem cannot be solved by “rationality,” as it is an affliction of the 
“rational” or “human” being, every such being has the inevitable desire 
to solve it. Thus it is that the proper concern of religion is no other than to 
resolve this ultimate antinomy.
DeMartino for Hisamatsu: I think that in effect Dr. Hisamatsu is now present­
ing his own answer to the question he originally asked you; namely, what 
is it in the nature of man that necessitates—and provides the ground for— 
religion? In Dr. Hisamatsu’s understanding, man is characterized by a cen­
tral opposition or “ultimate antinomy” that cannot be resolved by auto­
nomous reason in any of its several provinces—the cognitive-intellectual, 
the moral-volitional, or the aesthetic-emotional. Yet, it is precisely as a 
“rational” being that man is existentially ensnared in this all-pervading 
dualism. (Tillich: 'Yes.') Accordingly, man has to go beyond his autono­
mous reason in order to solve at its root this ultimate problem that his 
reason cannot solve with a solution that will nevertheless satisfy his reason. 
It is in this analysis that Dr. Hisamatsu finds not alone the necessity and the 
ground—or what he terms the “objective validity”—for religion, but also 
what he considers to be its true or justifiable raison d'etre.
Tillich: How does this differ from what I said about creative ground, judgment
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involving separation or estrangement, and then reconciliation as the final 
aim? Is there any difference?
Fujiyosbi to De Martino (in Japanese): Dr. Tillich’s resolution is historical— or 
relative; Dr. Hisamatsu’s is not.
DeMartino (in Japanese): No, Dr. Tillich’s final resolution is not historical; 
it is realized in Eternity.
Hisamatsu (in Japanese): Is this Eternity, for Dr. Tillich, separate from history 
or does it incorporate history?
De Martino for Hisamatsu: When you say that there is a “reconciliation” or 
“reunion” in Eternity...(Tillicb: Yes.)...does that Eternity include history? 
Tillich: “Include”? No, I wouldn’t say so.
De Martino for Hisamatsu: Not in any sense?
Ttllich: As potentiality, yes; but not as actuality.
DeMartino for Hisamatsu: What exactly is the relation between Eternity and 
history?
Tillicb: Out of Eternity, history comes or goes; and to Eternity it returns. 
DeMartino: Would you say that Eternity is expressed in history?
Tillicb: Yes.
Hisamatsu (in Japanese): When man strives for historical achievements in the 
worlds of morality, art, and learning, these achievements often come to be 
regarded as the objectives for which ordinary men live. Despite the fact 
that my standpoint is different from Dr. Tillich’s, I, too, would say that 
Eternity creates history or expresses itself in history. But I should like to 
begin the consideration of Eternity with the problem of the basic antinomy 
that encompasses morality, art, and learning; for it is the problem of this 
antinomy that opens up the direction toward Eternity—that is, toward
DeMartino to Hisamatsu (in Japanese): I think Dr. Tillich would agree. What 
Dr. Tillich does not yet sec, however, is the difference between the recon­
ciliation or reunion of which he spoke and the resolution of which you are 
speaking.
DeMartino for Hisamatsu: Though Dr. Hisamatsu’s understanding of what is 
meant by “reconciliation” or “reunion” is admittedly limited, his feeling 




Tillicb: “Resolution” comes from the Latin, solvere or re-solvere. “Resolution” 
means eliminating a complex that is disagreeable because it is full of 
tensions and conflicts; this is dissolved—the tensions are taken away. 
Now, isn’t reunion the same as taking away the tensions? I don’t see the 
difference.
Hisamatsu (in Japanese): In the Zen way of removing or dissolving the anti­
nomy, man’s combined agony, dilemma, and contradiction provides the 
“Afiwwr” for the resolution. That is why Zen makes so much of doubting. 
As Dr. Tillich likewise has written, ordinarily in religion—including Bud­
dhism—people are exhorted to have faith without doubt. But in Zen, on 
the contrary, people arc asked to doubt radically. This kind of doubt, 
however, is not that entertained in a scholarly or cognitive endeavor. The 
word may be intellectual, but it is far more fundamental than intellectual 
doubt; it is a “total” doubt. For this “Doubt” is oneself as the ultimate 
antinomy—that is, it is the “antinomic existence,” so to speak, of oneself 
and the world. Expressed otherwise, this “Doubt” is not merely of an 
“objective” character, but may be described as being of a “fundamentally 
subjective” character.
DeMartino for Hisamatsu: He is now trying to get at the difference by explain­
ing the Zen way to attain this resolution. For Zen, unlike many other reli­
gions—even other schools of Buddhism, not only does not deny but in­
deed requires doubt. In Zen, the necessary precondition for the solution of 
man’s ultimate antinomy is that radical “Doubt” in which man exhaustively 
actualizes himself and the world as the ultimate antinomy. Thus, in spite of 
its being a cognitive or intellectual term, this doubt is not narrowly intel­
lectual. It is, rather, the consummate crystallization of the basic dualistic 
opposition that engulfs the individual and the world.
Tillicb: Yes.
De Martino: Hence, in Zen, oneself and the world becoming thoroughly what I 
like to call this “Great-Doubt-Block”—which is no other than the ultimate 
antinomy actualized-in-itself—is a prerequisite to its resolution.
Tillicb: Is he acquainted with my Dynamics of Faitb?
DeMartino: Yes, Dr. Hisamatsu is well aware of—and earlier specifically 
referred to—your own writing on the important role of doubt in religion.
Tillicb: I sometimes have the feeling that his concept of Christian faith is the 
old-fashioned concept of believing in things.
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De Martino to Hisamatsu (in Japanese): For Dr. Tillich faith under no condition 
is ever a mattrr of sheer belief; it constantly entails doubt.
Hisamatsu (in Japanese): Yes; his is not ordinary faith.
De Martino: He understands that your faith comprehends the element of 
doubt.
Hisamatsu (in Japanese): In Zen, however, the dissolution of the Doubt is a 
matter not of faith, but of Awakening.
DeMartino for Hisamatsu: Dr. Hisamatsu is now getting to the critical differ­
ence. For in Zen, when one has become this consummately crystallized 
“Doubt” or 'antinomic-existence-in-itself/ the solution consists in the dis­
sipation of that Doubt not through faith but through a new Awakening. 
Hisamatsu (in Japanese): So that with the dispelling of the ultimate antinomy, 
every agony, contradiction, and dilemma is resolved in one and the same 
instant. This is the nature of the Zen resolution.
DeMartino for Hisamatsu: With the radical or “root” Awakening that is the 
breaking-up of the fully “rxistentialized” ultimate antinomy or “Great 
Doubt,” all of its problematic constituents—intellectual contradiction, 
emotional anguish, and volitional dilemma—arc “im-mediately” and total­
ly resolved.
Tillich: Resolved, but by anticipation!
DeMartino: No; this is the crucial difference. The Zen solution is not one 
of anticipation; it is an actual resolution.
De Martino to Hisamatsu (in Japanese): Dr. Tillich thought that the resolution 
of Zen is also by anticipation.
Hisamatsu (in Japanese): No; it is actual, not by anticipation.
De Martino for Hisamatsu: He confirms that it is an actual solution—which 
accordingly eventuates, I might add, not in a “future,” “transcendent,” 
or “symbolic” Eternity, but in what may be characterized as an “actualized 
eschatology,” Here-Now.
Tillicb: In time and space?
DeMartino for Hisamatsu: In this “opening-up”—or “break-through”—there 
is no “in time and space.”
Tillicb: But it can happen in time and space—here, yesterday, tomorrow?
DeMartino for Huamatsu: If it were no more than temporal or spatial, then it 
could not be said to be conclusive.
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De Martino to Hisamarsu (in Japanese): I think the purport of Dr. Tillich’s 
question is that if it is asserted that the Awakening is the actual resolution 
of man’s underlying binary opposition—which can be attained by any 
man—then it would seem to have to take place in time and space.
Hisamatsu (in Japanese): Yes; but with the Awakening, being just an '‘ordi­
nary man” comes to an end.
DeMartino for Hisamatsu: With the actualization of the resolution, man, 
ceasing to be simply an “ordinary man,” ceases to be simply in time and 
space. That is, since the dissolution of the ultimate antinomy comes about 
with the awakening of the “Sclf-Without-Form”—or the Self as “Form­
less-Form,” it is inappropriate any further to speak solely in terms of the 
ordinary “sclf-with-form.”
Tillich: What is the relationship between the man who is in doubt and the 
man in whom the awakening occurs? What is the relationship between 
these two men?
Hisamatsu (in Japanese): The distinction lies in the turning-over of the Self. 
DeMartino for Hisamatsu: The difference between the man who is the embodi­
ment of the Great Doubt and the man of Awakening is that with the latter, 
the Self, turning upon Itself, has broken-th rough and dispelled that Doubt. 
Tiliicb: All right. But this happens, for instance, to Dr. Hisamatsu one day.
If it happens to him then it happens between the year 1889, in which he 
was bom, and today.
Hisamatsu (in Japanese): The Buddhist text entitled the Avakemng of Faitb in 
the Mahayana does use the term “First-Awakening.” But if this meant literally 
a “first-time-awakening,” it would have not merely a beginning but also 
an ending. Such an awakening, obviously, could not be genuine. So from 
an ordinary time-space point of view, it may be said that the Awakening 
unfolds at a certain time and place. If, however, time and space were to 
belong to the awakening itself, then it would not be a true awakening.
DeMartino for Hisamatsu: Considered from the perspective of time-and-space, 
the Awakening may seem to take place in time-and-space. But considered 
from the perspective of the Awakening-in-Itself, it is neither conditioned 
nor restricted by either time or space. So if there is a temporal beginning 
or ending to the awakening—or if it is circumscribed by any sort of spatial 
limitation, then it is not a true awakening. The True Awakening—or
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Formless Self—in-Itself has neither a beginning, an ending, a special
time.
Tillicb: Then it cannot happen to a human being.
Hisamatsu (in Japanese): It is not that it is beyond the capability of a human 
being. Rather, with this new Self-awakening the problem of the basic 
antinomy mentioned earlier is resolved, so that one is no longer an “ordi­
nary” human being. Again, however, although we have said “new” Awak­
ening, the Awakening-in-itself has no newness or oldness.
Fujiyosbi (in Japanese): The Awakening is a complete “conversion.”
De Martino for Hisamatsu: Formless-Self-Awareness « different from the ordi­
nary self-awareness of man. But even to speak of it as different—he referred 
to it as “new'”—is to do so from the standpoint of the “old” or “ordinary” 
dualistic consciousness. For the “turning-over” that is this Awakening is 
the Self-actualization of what could perhaps be rendered in your terminolo­
gy as the ‘ground-of-being-itself? Now, can it be said that the ‘ground- 
of-being-itself begins or ends—or is at a particular point—in time, or is at a 
particular place in space?
Tillicb: No; but this happened to him, Dr. Hisamatsu, and not to Hitler.
DeMartino: Since, however, in happening “to him” his Self “turned over”— 
which means, if I may further interpret this, that it undergoes its fulfill­
ment in a ‘Great-Death’ or “dying-to-itself” that is at once a ‘Great-Birth’ 
“beyond birth-and-death”—the “him” that it “happened to” in one sense 
ceases “to be.”
Tillicb: Yes; but “his” Self.
DeMartino: This is the same issue that arose during the first conversation. 
The Actualization is not of “his self’ in dualistic contrast to “not his self.” 
On the contrary, it is precisely the breaking-up of the simple duality of 
“himself” and “not himself.”
Tillicb: Then I don’t understand why it occurred to him and not to his shoe­
maker or to Hitler.
DeMartino to Hisamatsu (in Japanese): Dr. Tillich says that it is your self­
awakening, because it was not realized, for example, by Hitler.
De Martino for Hisamatsu: He says that it cannot alone be specified as “my” 




Tillich: Yes, I understand that. But this is a faym de parlcr, that is, a kind of 
talk. He must make clear why it has something to do with him and not 
with his shoemaker, otherwise further discussion becomes impossible.
Hisamatsu (in Japanese): That this Awakening, while original and basic to all 
men, fails to come to pass in some is similar, for instance, to the case of 
children in whom reason has not yet evolved. As these children mature, 
reason develops and they become rational beings beyond their former state. 
I think it will be agreed that this being more rational is a truer way of life 
for man qua man. Likewise—and beyond that—there is the Formless Self,
• for which rationality is not the ultimate way of being, and to which the 
rational self awakens beyond itself. As this is the ultimately true way for 
human beings, every one ought to become awakened to this Self—which is 
to say that every one ought to resolve the antinomic bifurcation that 
plagues ordinary human existence.
DeMartino to Hisamatsu (in Japanese): But I think Dr. Tillich’s question has 
to do with the fact that what relates to—and ought to be effected by—all, 
is not accomplished by all.
Hisamatsu (in Japanese): This is because there can be no resolution to the reli­
gious problem unless it first becomes fully and exhaustively actualized in 
the person. Ordinarily, however, this consummation is not achieved, even 
though it ought to be.
De Martino for Hisamatsu; Dr. Hisamatsu began his last response by comparing 
the transformation brought about by the Awakening of the Self-Without- 
Form to that brought about by the emergence in man of reason. The 
child, for example, after the development of its reason may be said to have 
advanced to a truer—but not as yet the consummately true—way of human 
existence. For beyond reason there is the more radical awakening to—or 
by—the Formless Self. That this latter Awakening comes to fruition in 
some but not in all is accounted for by the earlier explanation that the 
necessary prerequisite for a solution to the religious problem is that it be­
come thoroughly exacerbated and exhaustively capture or “grasp” the 
individual. That is, notwithstanding that the problem can—and ought to— 
culminate in a total crystallization in everyone, actually it does not do so. 
Tillich: Yes, I understand that. But then it happens to somebody and not to 
somebody else.
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Hisamatsu (in Japanese): Even granting that it occurs to someone, it does 
not occur to any specially chosen one.
De Martino to Hisamatsu(in Japanese): Dr. Tillich is not saying that it is gained 
by any specially chosen person. What he is saying is that when reached 
by a person, it is reached by—and is the solution of—that person and not 
some other person.
Hisamarsu (in Japanese): That docs not make it a purely “individual” or “per­
sonal” solution. Just the opposite, it is a resolution that involves—and 
has to be made by—all mankind. Indeed, it is for this reason that it can be 
said to have an “objective” validity.
DeMartino for Hisamatsu; Albeit from one viewpoint the resolution may be 
seen as occurring to “this” person and not to “that” person, it is not ex­
clusively “this” person’s “private,” “personal,” or “individual” solution. 
For as a resolution of the funoamental antinomy intrinsic to human nature 
as such, it has a universal—or “objective”—validity.
Tillicb: Yes; but it is realized here.
Fujtyosbi: While it issues forth here, it has a common basis.
Tillicb: No, it is the principle—like the Holy Spirit in Christianity, which 
is a principle—that appears in one and does not appear in others.
DeMartino: Therefore you say that it has its locus in time and space.
Tillicb: Yes; that means it happens in time and space. If it is manifest in one 
individual and not in another individual, then time and space enter into the 
picture.
DeMartino to Hisamatsu (in Japanese): Dr. Tillich’s argument is that if the 
resolution can be said to come to fruition “in one” and not “in another,” 
then it must be said to come about in time and space.
Fujiyosbi (in Japanese): Dr. Tillich’s understanding is that the Awakening 
comes to pass in time and space.
DeMartino: It seems to be difficult for us to convey your exact import to Dr. 
Hisamatsu sharply enough in Japanese. Could I, therefore, again say that 
considered objectively—or dualistically—the Awakening may be said to 
have occurred to “him” and not to someone else. But in occurring “to him,” 
he is no longer “him” in simple dualistic opposition to “not him”—or, con­
sequently, to anyone or anything “other” to him. For as the ‘solution- 
through-dissolution’ of the crystallized polarity of “being-and-nonbeing,”
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the Awakening is precisely the Self-actualization of the non-duality of “him­
self ’ and “not himself.” Thus, as was also discussed during the first con­
versation, with the attainment of the resolution, one is at once “oneself’ 
and “not oneself,” just as one both “is” and “is not.” So it is an Awakening 
of, by, and to the “Formless” Self—or, in another characterization, the 
“Selfless” Self. Hence, though it would appear to have its locus in time and 
space, more correctly the Awakening must be said to have its locus in time- 
lcss-timc and in spaceless-space—or, to return to an earlier part of this 
discussion, in Eternity-Infinity.
Tillicb: Yes. Now this formulation is a little difficult. But as the hour is quite 
late, I think we should perhaps let the matter rest there for today. Good’ 
Good! Thank you very much. This was really wonderful. I trust it was as 
enjoyable for you as it was for me.
DeMartino for Hisamatsu: Dr. Hisamatsu says the pleasure is all his, and 
wishes to thank you.
Ttllich: I shall look forward to meeting you again after the forthcoming 
recess.
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